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I. INTRODUCTION "Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much
of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence." (Kenneth J. Arrow, 1972) The concept of trust has always played a crucial role in economics (cf. Arrow 1972) . It can be a money-maximizing strategy to trust someone more the higher that person's incentives are to be trustworthy.
In repeated settings, one is trustworthy (or cooperates) because one expects others to reciprocate (positively or negatively) one's behavior, and thus mutual trustworthiness leads to higher earnings for the actors.
Strategically motivated reciprocity can be carried out by the person who is directly affected by someone's act himself (on direct reciprocity, see, e.g., Fehr, Gächter 2000; Andreoni and Miller 1993) or by another person (on indirect reciprocity, see, e.g., Rockenbach and Milinski 2006; Seinen and Schram 2006; Engelmann and Fischbacher 2009 ). In modern societies, however, many contacts are anonymous, indirect, and rarely (if ever) repeated. One example of such transactions is anonymous online trades between private persons via platforms such as www.ebayclassifieds.com/ or www.craigslist.org/. Consequently, it is important to study how trustworthiness can be enhanced by the anticipation of a reward or punishment by an impartial stranger who does not have an incentive to reciprocate (strong indirect reciprocity). I.e., in this paper, "positive strong indirect reciprocity" is defined as a third-party reward in situations in which any strategic concerns for the third parties can be excluded.
1 Consider the following example, which illustrates the meaning and meaningfulness of anticipated (positive) "strong indirect reciprocity" for trustworthiness.
Think of a politician who runs for a post. The voters invest their trust in the candidate by voting for him.
Assume an institutional design in which reelection is not possible, and thus in which the politician has no strategic incentives to reciprocate that trust. Typically, not everything that is done behind the curtains of a public institution is transparent to the public. Therefore, it is not easy fully to judge how well the politician does his job. No image, after the politician has been elected, his institution implements a new policy. This new policy implies that reports on the effort provided by the politicians are publicly available. Imagine you learn from the reports that the politician does a good job. Imagine further that you are the head of a bank in which the very same politician applies for a loan. First of all, beyond all money-maximizing concerns from your perspective: would you give him the loan with a higher probability, compared to a situation in which 2 you had not learned that he has reciprocated his voters' trust (positive strong indirect reciprocity)? Second, would the probability of your giving him the loan be even higher if you knew that while the politician was doing his job he did not know that the report might become publically available (motivational crowding out/in of strong indirect reciprocity)? Third, would the politician put more effort in his work if he were able to anticipate that this could be rewarded by others who have no extrinsic incentives to do so (higher trustworthiness in anticipation of positive strong indirect reciprocity)? Finally, would more voters elect the politician if they knew in advance that he would have an incentive to invest in his good reputation in anticipation of a reward by others (higher trust)? This paper attempts to answers all these questions. It provides evidence that positive strong indirect reciprocity exists; it is anticipated by potential recipients; and it can change these recipients' previous behavior in an efficient way.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper explicitly to study the effect of anticipated positive strong indirect reciprocity on trustworthy behavior. 2 Following the call by Almenberg et al. (2011), 3 it is one of the few papers to study positive strong indirect reciprocity. Additionally, in this paper, the impartial stranger has a richer strategy set to condition her 4 rewards on the history of her beneficiary than in previous studies. So far, only one study analyzes whether there is a crowding out of strong indirect positive reciprocity, if a potential recipient of this reward can act strategically ).
Interestingly, in contrast to Stanca et al. (2009) , the present study finds no crowding out.
In the present experimental paper, a trust game is implemented and it is followed by a helping game 5 with a different group composition, i.e., the trustee of the trust game in one group becomes a receiver in a helping game in a different group. The helper has the possibility to reward a co-player conditional on his performance in the trust game. In the Baseline, subjects first play the trust game and receive the instructions for the helping game only afterwards, while in the Anticipation treatment, subjects are informed about the content of both games at the beginning of the experiment. Since the experiment is one-shot, any strategic concerns for the helpers are ruled out in both treatments.
Nonetheless, many helpers make positive transfers to trustees and send significantly more money as the trustees' return transfers increase. Helpers apparently care more about socially desirable behavior than about the motives behind trustees' transfers, i.e., on average, helpers' transfers are the same, regardless of whether the helping game is announced or not. Trustees anticipate helpers' behavior if the helping game 3 is announced, i.e., the absolute level of return transfers as well as the relative level to the investments are higher in the Anticipation treatment as compared to the Baseline. Investments, on average, do not differ between the Anticipation treatment and the Baseline.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: first, an overview of the relevant literature is presented; afterwards, the design of the experiment is explained. Next, hypotheses are explored. The results and the statistical analysis of the data are presented in the penultimate section. In the last section, the conclusions are drawn.
II. LITERATURE
I am aware of only three studies on positive strong indirect reciprocity. 6 In contrast to the present study, none of these three studies analyzes strategic versus unstrategic trustworthiness (due to an anticipation of a reward by an impartial stranger). The most closely related papers to the present study are Stanca (2009) and Stanca et al. (2009) . 7 In both studies, the return transfer in a one-shot variant of the trust game either comes from the recipient of the investment or from a stranger. 8 In contrast to the present study, both papers focus on the strong indirect reciprocity (return transfers) and do not analyze in detail the effect on behavior of a player in anticipation of strong indirect reciprocity (a change in investment). Stanca (2009) , however, does report not finding significant differences in the investments. This means that in his experiment the strategic motives for the players awaiting direct or indirect reciprocity do not seem to matter. Stanca et al. (2009) hypothesize that the motives behind the reciprocated action can crowd out strong indirect reciprocity (rewards by impartial strangers). The treatment difference here is whether the first mover knows that the second stage will follow. The results confirm their hypothesis, i.e., if the strong indirect reciprocator knows that the first mover was aware of the second stage, she transfers a smaller amount compared to a situation in which the second game was not announced. Notably, the results in the present study are not in line with their hypothesis. Almenberg et al. (2011) implement a one-shot dictator game where a player can transfer either none, half, or all of her endowment to another player, and a third party can either punish or reward the dictator. Furthermore, the number of recipients, the achievable share, and the effectiveness of the reward and punishment given by the third party are varied across treatments. In all treatments, dictators are aware of the presence of the third party. Thus, an effect of anticipated strong indirect reciprocity cannot be studied 6 In fact, the basic design in Almenberg et al. (2011) is very similar to Stanca (2009) and Stanca et al. (2009) . In all three studies presented in this section, player A transfers an amount of money to player B which can be observed and rewarded and/or sanctioned by player C. 7 Here only the papers on the topic of downstream/social indirect reciprocity (A acts towards B and C acts as a reaction to this in a certain way towards B) are discussed, since these papers are most relevant for the present study. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that there are also interesting papers on generalized/upstream indirect reciprocity (A acts towards B and B acts as a reaction to that in a certain way towards A). Notable examples are Dufwenberg et al. (2001) ; Boyd and Richardson 1989; Greiner and Levati (2005) ; Güth et al. (2001) . 8 He calls it a gift-exchange game.
4 in their setting. The authors' main findings show that selfish behavior is punished while generous behavior is rewarded, and that rewards are at least as common as punishments.
Quite a few studies analyze negative strong indirect reciprocity. Only one recent paper examines the anticipation effect of punishment. Balafoutas, Nikiforakis, and Grechenig (2014) demonstrate, in a oneshot, three-player taking game, that taking rates decrease in anticipation of unstrategic punishment by an impartial third party. Furthermore, their paper shows that third-party punishment significantly decreases if counter-punishment directed towards the third party is allowed. However, the focus of their paper lies on counter-punishment, which could be interpreted as an emotional reaction or revenge. run a repeated public-goods experiment with punishment. In one treatment, only members of the own group can be punished, while in the other treatment, members of the own as well as of another group can be punished. The authors find evidence for the existence of negative strong indirect reciprocity,
i.e., members of stranger-groups are punished. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) suggest that Carpenter and Mathews (2004) "could not rule out third-party punishment for reasons of self-interest". There is also a strong disciplining component in their design, i.e., punishing someone should lead to more norm compliance in future periods. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) find strong evidence for third-party punishment in their oneshot, three-person dictator experiment. Bernhard et al. (2006) run one-shot dictator games with third-party punishment in Papua New Guinea. They find that in-group members are avenged more than out-group members, while the affiliation of the punished person does not play a role for the punishers' decisions. On the contrary, norm violators expect to be punished less if the third party belongs to their peer group than if she belongs to a different group.
III. DESIGN
This section is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection, the experimental design is explained;
in the second, the motivation behind this design is discussed; and finally, the experimental procedures followed in the experiment are reported.
III.1. GAME AND TREATMENTS
The game consists of two parts and subjects were aware of that. 9 In the Baseline, they receive specific information about the content of each part only immediately before playing the relevant part of the experiment. In the Anticipation treatment, instructions for both parts are handed out at the beginning of the 5 experiment. 10 Subjects are explicitly told that they cannot lose the money they have earned in a previous part in any of the subsequent parts. In the experiment, the experimental currency unit (ECU) is used. All instructions are read out aloud by the experimenter to achieve common knowledge about the procedure.
11
At the beginning of the experiment, each subject is randomly assigned one of the three roles A, B, or C. Players keep their roles for the two parts of the experiment. The roles A and B are assigned to 11 subjects each and the role C is assigned to 2 players per session. The distribution of the roles is not made explicit to the subjects. They only know which roles there are, their own role, and, at the relevant point in time, the role of their co-player. The group composition differs between the parts, i.e., players from part 1 do not meet in part 2. The game is played only once.
Part 1:
In part 1, the reduced trust game (TG) (first introduced by Berg et al. 1995 Brandts and Charness (2011) show that, if the focus lies on the comparison of decisions within strategies, using the strategy method can be problematic. For the comparison between treatments, the main limitation of that method is that the "strategy method provides a lower bound for testing for treatment effects" (p. 392). A similar argument is made in Fischbacher et al. (2012) . 13 Please note that, in case of zero investment, π (180) In the box, the screen for the elicitation of trustees' choices via the strategy method is depicted. In the first column, the trustee can see how high the investment could have been. In the second column, the participant sees a radio button, on which he can click -for each possible investment X>0, he can choose how much he wants to send back to his investor, i.e., he can choose for each investment X>0 his return transfer X*Y, where Y can be 0 ("nothing"), 1 ("the transfer"), 2 ("double the transfer"), or 3 ("triple the transfer"). Only the transfer decision for the relevant situation will become payoff-relevant.
Part 2:
For the helping game (HG) (similar to the dictator game, as in Forsythe et al. 1994) , played in part 2, new groups with two players are formed. Each group consists of a player A and a co-player. The randomly 7 selected co-player is either player C or player B, who has not been matched with this player A in the trust game, i.e., absolute stranger matching is implemented. Player A (from now on called the helper) is endowed with E HG A = 100 ECU. She can transfer any natural number of ECU (t HG A) from 0 to 100 to her co-player. The transfer is tripled by the experimenter and then transferred to the relevant co-player. Player A's decision is elicited using the strategy method (Selten 1967) .
14 She has to make a decision for every possible composition, i.e., she has to state how much she wants to transfer in case her co-player is player B or in case her co-player is player C. Additionally, supposing B is her co-player, she can make her decision conditional on the history of the player B in the TG, i.e., she can make her transfer conditional on any possible return transfer t 14 Again, one could argue that the strategy method prompts subjects to take different decisions for different situations. However, the results show that helpers indeed condition their transfers on the relative return transfers of the trustees, but less on the investments that trustees receive. Furthermore, helpers' transfers are more strongly correlated with trustees' history in the Anticipation treatment compared to the Baseline, which again cannot be explained by the use of the strategy method. 15 Subjects are informed in the instructions that the players who are not randomly selected to become the helper's co-players, can earn money m in an additional task. It is not made explicit in the instructions how many subjects have to perform that task, nor how much money can be earned in that task. Only the players who are chosen to perform that task receive additional instructions for the task on their computer screen. The task is to count the number of zeros in tables that consisted of 150 randomly ordered zeros and ones (similar to the task used in Abeler et al. 2011) . Each correct answer increases m by 50 ECU. The payoff for these players is therefore π HG other player = m. In each session, 10 of the helpers were matched with one player B each and one helper was matched with one player C. Therefore, one B player and one C player were not chosen to become a co-player of the helper.  … a Player B who has been sent X Taler in the first part of the experiment and… … sent back 0*X Taler, I will now send ____ Taler.
… sent back 1*X Taler, I will now send ____ Taler.
… sent back 2*X Taler, I will now send ____ Taler.
… sent back 3*X Taler, I will now send ____ Taler.
In the first box, the first screen of the elicitation of helpers' choices via the strategy method is depicted. Here, the helper can choose how much she wants to send to her co-player in case her co-player is a player C or in case her coplayer is a player B who has not received an investment. The second box shows the remaining screens of the helpers' strategy method. Here, the helper can choose how much she wants to transfer to her co-player in case he is a player B and has received an investment of X (X=10 on the 2 nd screen, X=20 on the 3 rd screen, etc.) and in case he has then sent back Y*X (Y can be 0, 1, 2, or 3). On the actual screens of the players, instead of "X", "0*X", or "1*X" etc., the absolute numbers of the respective transfers are written. The helper can insert in each line a number between 0 and 100. Only the transfer decision for the relevant situation will become payoff-relevant.
After the subjects have finished the experiment, the subjects complete questionnaires regarding their attitudes towards trust, risk, and reciprocity, as well as demographics.
III.2. MOTIVATION FOR THE DESIGN
A restricted version of the trust game is used for reasons of simplification, i.e., this allows helpers to have a complete overview of every possible situation they might be facing. This method allows for testing for strong indirect reciprocity of helpers, i.e., it provides detailed data for helpers' transfers conditional on previous behavior of their co-players.
The inclusion of a player C, who does not take any actions, helps to identify an individual benchmark for the helpers' general willingness to help. Helpers' transfers to C players cannot be interpreted as a reward for any previous action. These players have the same income as players B, who are passive, i.e., who do not receive an investment and who therefore cannot make a return transfer.
In the experiment, a player A becomes the helper in the helping game. Charness and Rabin (2002) have developed a theory that analyzes disinterested social preferences (non-self-interested distributional preferences). One potential critique is that in the present study the helping game involves a mixture of selfinterested and disinterested preferences. Giving each player feedback about the payoffs after each game and controlling for these payoffs in a regression analysis (instead of trying to elicit beliefs about their earnings)
helps to disentangle these motives. Furthermore, participation in the first part of the experiment facilitates the understanding of the strategy method in the helping game.
III.3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Experiments were run at the University of Bonn in May 2010 and in January 2012. The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) . Four sessions with 96 subjects were held, leading to 22 independent observations per treatment for the roles A and B, respectively. Subjects were invited from the University of Bonn using ORSEE software (Greiner 2004 ) and had no experience with related experiments, i.e., they had neither participated in trust games nor in dictator or helping games in the past. Most of the subjects were students. 19 of the subjects were economics students, 20 were law students.
The remaining subjects came from various different disciplines. 44 participants (46%) were female. The average earning was 12.52 Euro. 16 The sessions lasted 70 minutes on average.
IV. HYPOTHESES
In the helping game, under the assumption of pure payoff maximization, the theoretical prediction is zero transfers. A self-interested, payoff-maximizing trustee has no monetary incentive for a positive return transfer, irrelevant of the information about the helping game. A rational, self-interested, payoff-maximizing investor anticipates this and does not invest any points in any treatment. From the theoretical point of view, under the assumption of pure payoff maximization and common knowledge, the unique Nash Equilibrium predicts zero transfers in all games and in all treatments.
However, it has been shown that, in helping games, positive transfers are observed (cf., e.g., Forsythe et al. 1994) , and in trust games positive transfers are made in both directions (see, e.g., Berg et al. 1995 ). The first is explained by social preferences such as warm glow (Andreoni 1990 ). The latter is explained by strong direct reciprocity modeled by, e.g., Rabin (1993) , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) , Falk and Fischbacher (2006) , or Levine (1998) . These models assume that an actor has a reciprocity parameter and that the person has a positive utility from punishing unkind action and rewarding kind action.
Which actions are perceived as kind depends on the particular model. In fact, the intuition of the model by Levine (1998) is not restricted to two-player direct interactions. In the following, this model will be used to derive (most of the) behavioral hypotheses in the present study. In Levine (1998) a player i = 1, …., n receives a direct utility of ui and has a coefficient of altruism -1 < ai < 1. Therefore, he receives an adjusted utility of
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. In other words, when λ > 0, a person derives a positive utility from his own direct utility (which can be his payoff) and, in addition, a positive utility from rewarding another person for his altruism, i.e., i's utility from j's utility is greater the greater j's coefficient of altruism is. 17 In the model, a player i maximizes her utility given her preferences and her beliefs about the preferences of her co-players. In the present experiment, the helper does not need to form her own beliefs about the preferences of her co-player, since she can infer them from the trustee's return transfers to his investor. Assuming that at least some helpers have a coefficient of altruism ai > 0 and λ > 0, it follows:
The higher a helper's co-player's return transfers in the trust game are, the more help will be transferred.
The second key research question is whether helpers' evaluation of trustees' altruism differs between the Baseline and the Anticipation treatment. Levine's model does not make specific assumptions about intentions behind the displayed altruism. Therefore, from Levine (1998) it does not follow that helpers' transfers should differ between the Baseline and the Anticipation treatment. I.e., if helpers in the experiment care mainly about socially desirable behavior, they should not make different transfers in the Baseline compared to the Anticipation treatment. However, Falk et al. (2008) show that intentions matter.
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If a trustee anticipates that he will be rewarded by a helper in the Anticipation treatment, and therefore increases his return transfer for strategic reasons, his act might be perceived as less kind. Falk et al. (2008) argue that players acting out of intrinsic motives will be rewarded more than other players. This finding suggests that, in the present experiment, helpers' transfers should be higher in the Baseline than in the Anticipation treatment because, in the Baseline, trustees' return transfers cannot be strategically motivated.
Similarly, Stanca et al. (2009) find that more strong indirect reciprocity is displayed when strategic motivations can be ruled out. This leads to: Following the model in Levine (1998) , one can derive the following prediction about trustees' return transfers in the Baseline:
The trustees in the trust game make higher positive return transfers the higher the investment they receive.
In the Anticipation treatment, "predictive power of the theory is about what we would expect from a signaling model" (Levine 1998, p. 605) . Since the trustee not only cares about being altruistic (reciprocal) to others (to the investor), but also cares about his personal utility (his payoffs), he has to form beliefs about whether signaling that he is altruistic (trustworthy) can be beneficial to him. In the Baseline, the expected probability of being rewarded for revealed altruism (trustworthiness) is zero. 19 In the Anticipation treatment, however, the trustee knows that a helper has the opportunity to reward him. If at least some trustees expect some helpers to have a coefficient of altruism ai > 0 and λ > 0, they should expect to receive higher transfers in the helping game the more trustworthy they are, i.e., they anticipate the prediction in Hypothesis 1a. If a positive number of trustees expects their helper's ai to be large enough to offset the monetary loss from higher return transfers, these trustees have an incentive to make higher return transfers in the Anticipation treatment than in the Baseline. Consequently, one can derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b: The trustees in the trust game make higher positive return transfers in the Anticipation treatment than in the Baseline.
Costa-Gomes et al. (2012) find a positive correlation between an investors' investment and his optimism about a return transfer. Hence, if at least some investors anticipate the predictions about return transfers, which follows from Levine (1998) , this leads to:
Hypothesis 3: Investors will make higher investments in the Anticipation treatment than in the Baseline.
V. RESULTS
This section is organized as follows: first, the hypotheses concerning the transfers are tested nonparametrically 20 and then robustness of the results with parametric tests including further control variables is checked. The results are presented in the same order as the respective hypotheses.
V.1. HELPERS' TRANSFERS
This section first investigates whether helpers' transfers depend on relative return transfers made by trustees in the trust game and on the investment received by the trustees. Then, treatment differences on helpers' transfers are tested. In addition, it is analyzed which level of the return transfers is particularly strongly rewarded, i.e., what level of return transfers is regarded as especially altruistic and therefore worth to be rewarded.
One quarter of helpers (11 out of 44) always make zero transfers in the helping game (7 in Baseline and 4 in Anticipation). 21 As one can see in Figure 1 Table 5 in the Appendix). 23 This finding is further supported by the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (see Table 7 in the Appendix). 24 See Table 8 in the Appendix for all pairwise comparisons.
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Figure 1
Helpers' Transfers by Treatment
The upper figure displays helpers' transfers in the Baseline and the lower figure in the Anticipation treatment. On the x-axis, the exact condition is displayed, i.e., one can see if the co-player is either Player C or a passive Player B (no investment and thus no opportunity for a return transfer) or an active Player B who has received an investment of X and has made a relative return transfer of Y (Y=0: trustees keeps full transfer; Y=1: trustee returns transfer and keeps rent; Y=2: equal split; Y=3 full return). On the y-axis, mean helpers' transfers are displayed for the particular situation. Standard errors are indicated. Random effects Tobit regressions. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The Anticipation dummy equals 1 for all observations of the Anticipation treatment, relative return transfers controls for the relative return of a trustee (Y) for a given investment, investment controls for the investment the trustee has received, own investment is the investment the helper has transfers in the trust game himself to his trustee, Anticipation*relative return transfer and Anticipation*investment are interaction terms, own profit in TG controls for the helper's profit from part 1 of the experiment. Transfer to passive B and Transfer to C are the levels transferred to passive players. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. Left-censored = 577; right-censored = 14.
Using the random effects Tobit regression model, one can confirm the visual impression. 25 The dependent variable is the helpers' transfers in the helping game. In no model in Table 1 is the dummy 25 The Tobit regression is used because, in the helping game, helpers' transfers are exogenously restricted with an upper and a lower bound; the lower bound is usually zero-giving. Bardsley (2008) shows that subjects also take money if they have the opportunity in similar situations. In the present setting, this seems plausible, since, as stated before, relative return transfers are rewarded a lot by helpers, while very low relative return transfers lead to very low helpers' transfers and often to transfers of zero. Tobit regressions account for the possibility that (some) subjects might have even taken money instead of giving nothing by controlling for censoring. Moreover, as there are 24 transfer decisions per individual (due to the strategy method -only taking into account transfers to active 15 variable for the Anticipation treatment significant. Model 1 in Table 3 shows that the main determining factor for helpers' transfers is the relative return transfer of trustees, i.e., higher relative return transfers yield higher helpers' transfers. 26 The investment the trustees received (resulting in a higher or lower absolute return transfer) has a significant, but very small, positive influence on helpers' transfers. The coefficient is not significant once one controls for an interaction between the treatment and the effect of the investment (see Models 4).
Model 2 controls for helpers' own experience in the trust game. It shows that pure willingness to send positive transfers does not lead to higher helpers' transfers (variable own investment). However, there could be a small wealth effect: the more a helper has earned in the previous trust game, the more willing she is to help in the helping game. 27 The significance vanishes once one controls for helpers' transfers to passive players (see Model 3), which can be used as a measure of a helpers' individual benchmark of altruism.
In Model 4, an interaction term between the Anticipation treatment and the investment to the trustee and an interaction term between the Anticipation treatment and the relative return transfer of the trustee are added. The coefficient of the investment is not significant in this model. On the contrary, coefficients of both interaction terms are significant and positive. The most important result derived from Model 3 in the Tobit regressions is that trustees are treated somewhat differently in the Anticipation treatment than in the Baseline. In contrast to the prediction in Hypothesis 1b, they receive, on average, for a given history (a particular investment followed by a particular return transfer) a higher transfer from a helper, if they can invest in their good reputation knowing that the helping game will follow. This result contradicts the findings in Stanca et al. (2009) . It also calls for a new model of (positive strong indirect) reciprocity in which other factors besides intentions are considered. In the present experiment, helpers seem to care more about socially desirable behavior of trustees than about intrinsically motivated intentions behind the return transfers.
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In the regressions, there is strong left-censoring, which indicates that helpers would possibly like not just to give less money to, but even to take money from greedy trustees. The results from the random effects Tobit regression mainly support Hypothesis 1a, while there is no clear support of Hypothesis 1b.
This leads to: players), random effects models which take individual specific effects into account are in order. The coefficient of the treatment dummy is directly interpretable in the sense that it gives exactly the value of the average marginal effect of the independent variable. 26 The Spearman correlation analysis is used to see if any personal traits of participants influenced their helpers' transfers. Negative reciprocity is negatively correlated with helpers' transfers (Spearman's rho = -0.3247; p-value = 0.0315). Besides that, neither the gender nor any other personality trait is significantly correlated with helpers' transfers. 27 One could also interpret that coefficient as a proxy for generalized/upstream indirect reciprocity -the more a helper has received in return from his own trustee, the more does she help in the helping game. With the help of the regression, one can disentangle that motive from the social/downstream indirect reciprocity motive of the helper, which is captured in the variable relative return transfers. 28 One should be cautious in interpreting this result, since in the present experiment helpers arise from the population of investors. Therefore, they might feel they belong to the group of investors. As a result, they might care more about the total earnings resulting from high return transfers of investors than about potential strategic motives of trustees.
Result 1a:
The higher the relative return transfers a trustee makes in the trust game, the more he receives from a helper. Generally, the investment that a trustee has received does not seem to determine a helper's transfer to the trustee. for each investment for a relative return transfer of Y<2 he receives a lower transfer than a passive player;
and, respectively, for each investment a relative return transfer of Y=3>2 earns him a higher transfer by a helper as to a passive player. Indeed, this visual impression is supported by Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (see Table 6 in the Appendix) in both treatments. 30 Given these observations on can state:
29 Please note that each Player C and each Player B receives an endowment of 100 ECU. Only after receiving an investment from Player A can a Player B become active and thereby increase the investor's and his own payoffs. In case Player B returns the entire transfer, he ends up with the same payoff as a Player C or a passive Player B (with 100 ECU). 30 As an exception from that pattern, in the Anticipation treatment, if a trustee makes a relative return transfer of Y=1 and has previously received an investment of X≥20, he receives on average the same transfer from a helper as a passive player. Furthermore, in the Anticipation treatment a relative return transfer of Y=3 for a given investment of X=10 leads to the same transfer as to player C.
Result 1a‫:׳‬ Helpers transfer to trustees, who implemented an equal split in the trust game, does not significantly differ from the transfer to passive players. Relative return transfers that leave the investor with more money than the trustee lead to higher helpers' transfers, while lower return transfers lead to lower helpers' transfers.
V.2. RETURN TRANSFERS
This section analyzes whether trustees correctly anticipate helpers' transfer decisions and therefore reciprocate investors' transfers more in the Anticipation treatment than in the Baseline. In addition, a positive correlation between investments and return transfers is examined.
Figure 2

Relative Return Transfers by Treatment
On the x-axis, the investment the trustee has received is depicted; on the y-axis, mean relative return transfers are displayed. Standard errors are indicated.
There are 12 out of 44 trustees who do not make a positive return transfers (9 in Baseline and 3 in Anticipation). 31 For the average return transfers, a significant difference between the Anticipation treatment and the Baseline (Mann-Whitney rank-sum |z|=2.135, p = 0.0327) is found. In addition, the pattern of the 31 The likelihood of any positive return transfer is significantly higher in the Anticipation treatment: 1-sided Fisher's exact = 0.044. This is the first indication of the predicted treatment effect by Hypothesis 2b.
results presented in Figure 2 shows a difference between the treatments. Specifically, in the Baseline, one can observe a typical outcome for the trust game (see Falk et al. 2011) : the higher the investment, the higher the relative return transfer (Spearman's Rho: rS=0.1496, p= 0.0870). In the Anticipation treatment, the reverse occurs: low investments are reciprocated a lot, while the relative returns of high investments do not differ significantly between the treatments (Spearman's Rho: rS= -0.1505, p= 0.0849). 32 The relative return transfers differ significantly between the treatments for investments lower than 50 (Mann-Whitney ranksum |z|=1.681, p ≤ 0.0927), while they are not statistically different for the highest two possible investments (Mann-Whitney rank-sum |z|=0.605, p ≥ 0.5453). 33 Furthermore, the motives behind the return transfers seem to change in the Anticipation treatment compared to the Baseline, i.e., subjects "invest" in a reputation of being trustworthy when it is cheap (when a high relative return transfer results in a comparatively low absolute return transfer) and do not reciprocate high investments more than in the Baseline. This finding is especially interesting given that studies involving reward by second parties (direct reciprocity) in one-shot, public-good games have not found an increase in socially desirable behavior (e.g., Dufwenberg et al. 2001; Walker and Halloran 2004) . Thus, the findings support Hypothesis 2b, while Hypothesis 2a is only supported in the Baseline.
Here, a random effects ordered Probit regression is used to test which influence factors determine the return transfers. 34 The most important insight from the models in Table 4 is that controlling for different additional influence variables, the data confirm Hypothesis 2b, i.e., the coefficient of the treatment dummy Random effects ordered Probit regressions. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The Anticipation dummy equals 1 for all observations of the Anticipation treatment, investment controls for the investment (X) the trustee has received. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
V.3. INVESTMENTS
This section tests whether investors correctly anticipate the different return transfers between the treatments and therefore invest more in the Anticipation treatment compared to the Baseline.
Statistically, the investments do not, on average, differ between the treatments (Mann-Whitney rank-sum: |z| = 0.465, p = 0.6419), but the cumulative distribution function of the investments in Figure 3 shows that the distribution of the investments differs. Specifically, in the Anticipation treatment, zero-20 investments are never made, whereas in the Baseline, zero-transfers are present. 35 Nonetheless, the data do not support Hypothesis 3 and lead to:
Result 3: On average, investments do not statistically differ significantly between treatments.
Figure 3
Investments by Treatment
The graph shows an empirical cumulative distribution function of the investments for both treatments. On the x-axis, the investment is depicted; on the y-axis, the estimated probability for each investment is displayed.
V.4. EARNINGS
As mentioned above, helpers seem to care more about socially desirable outcomes than about the motives behind trustees' transfers. Those preferences raise the question of whether the monetary efficiency is, in fact, higher in the Anticipation treatment. As shown above, helpers make, on average, the same transfers in the Anticipation treatment as in the Baseline given a particular return transfer and trustees anticipate that.
I.e., trustees make higher relative return transfers in the Anticipation treatment especially if such an "investment" in a good reputation is cheap in absolute terms. It turns out that the money-maximizing strategy for trustees (given the strategy of the helpers) in the Anticipation 36 treatment is fully to return (Y=3) each investment (X) (see Table 11 in the Appendix for a calculation of possible payoffs for each strategy of a trustee). Thus, trustees do not anticipate helpers' positive strong indirect reciprocity enough to maximize their profits.
Given the decisions of trustees investors' money-maximizing strategy is to invest X=0 in Baseline and X=30 in the Anticipation treatment (see Table 12 should be treated with caution, since the earnings of the players arise from the particular design and the matching in the experiment, i.e., trustees become helpers' co-players in the helping game not only in the Anticipation treatment, but also in the Baseline, and Players A also have the role of investors as of a helpers. 36 Obviously, in the Baseline (as discussed in chapter IV), in expectations the money-maximizing strategy for trustees is to send zero transfers (since in the Baseline trustees do not know that the helping game will follow). Similarly, (as well discussed in chapter IV) the money-maximizing strategy in both treatments for helpers is to send zero transfer. Quantitatively, trustees follow the optimal strategy (see Table 12 in the Appendix). 37 See the level-k literature, as in Nagel (1995) 
VI. CONCLUSION
From a welfare point of view, rewards are better for the society than punishment since they do not lead to an efficiency loss. Rand et al. (2009) show in a repeated public goods game that "reward is as effective as punishment for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total earnings. Moreover, when both options are available, reward leads to increased contributions and payoff, whereas punishment has no effect on contributions and leads to lower payoff" (Rand et al. 2009 (Rand et al. , p. 1272 . In a world in which anonymous interactions become more and more frequent (e.g., via the internet), it is important to pay more attention to economic consequences of reward systems by impartial strangers. Surprisingly, until now only a small number of papers analyzes rewards rather than punishments and even less literature considers rewards given 
General Instructions for Participants
You are about to take part in economic experiments. Depending on the decisions that you and others make, you can earn a substantial amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions carefully.
The written statements you have received from us serve your own private information only. During the experiments, any communication whatsoever is forbidden. If you have any questions, please ask only us. Please raise your hand and we will come to you. Disobeying these rules will lead to exclusion from the experiments and from all payments.
During the experiments, we speak not of Euro, but instead of Taler. Your entire income is hence initially calculated in Taler. The total number of Taler you earn during the experiments is converted into Euro at the end and paid to you in cash, at the rate of 1 Taler = 2 Eurocent.
In addition, each participant is paid a lump sum of 4 Euro for showing up today.
You will take part in several experiments today. The instructions to each experiment will be handed out to you one by one, just before the respective experiment is about to begin. On the following pages, we will describe the exact procedure of the first experiment.
In this experiment, there are three different roles: Player A, Player B, and Player C. At the beginning of the experiment, you are randomly assigned one of these three roles.
In the experiment, you are required to make your decision once only; i.e., the experiment is conducted only once. You will thus make no repeated decisions today.
Information on the First Experiment
In this experiment, one Player A and one Player B are randomly paired. Each player initially receives 100 Taler, which we shall refer to in the following as the initial endowment.
This experiment consists of 2 stages. The income at the end of the first part of the experiment is therefore:
If he/she has sent 0: 100 If he/she has sent X: 100 -X + (X * Y)
Player B:
If he/she receives 0: 100 If he/she receives X: 100 + 3 * X -(X * Y)
___________________________________________________________________
Here, X may be equal to 0, to 10, to 20, to 30, to 40, to 50, or to 60.
Y may be equal to 0, to 1, to 2, or to 3.
Examples:
1.) If, for example, Player A sends a sum of X = 10 Taler and B decides to send back three times the amount of the transfer (Y = 3), then both players have the following income:
29 A: 100 -10 + (10 * 3) = 120, and B: 100 + 3 * 10 -3 * 10 = 100.
2.) If, for example, Player A sends a sum of X = 60 Taler and B decides to send back the amount of the transfer (Y = 1), then both players have the following income:
A: 100 -60 + (60 * 1) = 100, and B: 100 + 3 * 60 -1 * 60 = 220.
3.) If, for example, Player A sends a sum of X = 40 Taler and B decides to send back twice the amount of the transfer (Y = 2), then both players have the following income:
A: 100 -40 + (40 * 2) = 140, and B: 100 + 3 * 40 -2 * 40 = 140.
However, only at the end of Stage 2 are you told how high your income is from the experiment.
Player C does not have to make any decision in this experiment. Player C's payoff in this experiment is 100 Taler.
The experiment ends here. You are then told how high your income is from the experiment. Further experiments follow -however, it is impossible for you to be assigned once again to a group with the same players. Further, you cannot lose your payoffs from the experiments. Following the final experiment, you will be given a questionnaire. Once you have filled in the questionnaire, you will receive your payoff from us in cash. In order to receive your payoff, please bring all documents you have received from us with you. Participants in this experiment have the same roles as in the first experiment. Hence, this means that a participant who had role A in the first experiment will still have role A in this experiment; a participant who had role B in the first experiment will still have role B in this experiment; and a participant who had role C in the first experiment will still have role C in this experiment. Random assignation is conducted anonymously, and we ensure that you are not assigned once again to a group with the same players as in the first experiment.
This second experiment also consists of two stages.
Stage 1:
In the first stage, Player A receives an endowment of 100 Taler. He or she now has to decide how many of these 100 Taler to send his or her co-player (full numbers between 0 and 100). Every Taler sent is tripled and credited to the other player's account. The other player -who is not drawn -is given the possibility to increase his or her own income individually, by way of a small task. (Precise instructions for this task will appear later on this player's screen.)
Whether the co-player is a Player
The income from the second experiment is therefore:
100 -(what A sent the co-player)
Co-player (B or C, depending on the draw in Stage 2):
3 * (what A sent the co-player)
Player not drawn (B or C, depending on the draw in Stage 2):
Income from the individual small task Examples:
1.) If Player A should hence decide to enter the following numbers in the second table: top line 1, second line 13, third line 17, bottom line 0; and if the co-player assigned to Player A is a Player B who was sent 10 Taler by his co-player in the first experiment, and who in turn decided to send nothing back, then the payoffs from this second experiment are as follows for Player A, who made the decision here:
100 -1 = 9. The payoff for the co-player assigned to Player A is: 1 * 3 = 3.
2.) If Player A should decide to enter the following numbers in the first table: top line 99, second line 14; and if the co-player assigned to Player A is a Player C, then the payoffs from this second experiment are as follows for Player A, who has made the decision here:
100 -99 = 1. The payoff for the co-player assigned to Player A is: 99 * 3 = 297.
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The experiment ends here. You will then hear about your payoff from the first and second experiment. Further experiments will follow -however, it is impossible for you to be assigned once again to a group with the same players. Further, you cannot lose your payoffs from the experiments. Following the final experiment, you will be given a questionnaire. Once you have filled in the questionnaire, you will receive your payoff from us in cash. In order to receive your payoff, please bring all documents you have received from us with you.
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Control Questions for Experiment Two In this part of the experiment, you are asked to decide in 10 different situations (lotteries) between option A and B. These situations will be presented to you on consecutive screens. The two lotteries each comprise 2 possible monetary payoffs, one high and one low, which will be paid to you with different probabilities.
The options A and B will be presented to you on the screen, as in the following example:
The computer uses a random draw program, which assigns you payments exactly according to the denoted probabilities.
For the above example, this means: Option A obtains a payoff of 2 Euro with a probability of 10% and a payoff of 1.60 Euro with a probability of 90%. Option B obtains a payoff of 3.85 Euro with a probability of 10% and a payoff of 0.10 Euro with a probability of 90%. Now you have to click on the particular option you decide for.
Please note that, at the end of the experiment, only one of the 10 situations will eventually be paid. Yet, each of the situations can be randomly chosen with equal probability to be the payoff-relevant one. After this, a draw will determine whether for the payoff-relevant situation the high payoff (2.00 Euro or 3.85 Euro) or the low payoff (1.60 Euro or 0.10 Euro) will be paid. The shaded area highlights all comparisons that do not lead to a significant effect at the 10-percent level. The shaded area highlights all comparisons that do not lead to a significant effect at the 10-percent level. The shaded area highlights all comparisons that do not lead to a significant effect at the 10-percent level. The shaded area highlights all comparisons that do not lead to a significant effect at the 10-percent level. The shaded area highlights all comparisons that do not lead to a significant effect at the 10-percent level. The orange areas highlight the maximal profit a player B could have earned given an investment. The orange areas highlight the maximal profit an investor could have earned in the trust game in the two conditions.
VIII.2 TABLES
